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Defamation in Hong Kong and the
People's Republic of China: Potential
Perils of Two Standards of Free Speech
By MELISSA K. BAUMAN*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997 sovereignty over Hong Kong will return to the People's Re-
public of China (PRC) after being exercised by Great Britain since the
Opium War (1840-42). The Joint Declaration between Great Britain
and the PRC, whiph states the terms of the exchange, holds that Hong
Kong law will remain in effect and the capitalist system and way of life
will be maintained for a period of at least fifty years after 1997.1
Within this seemingly innocuous pact to preserve the law of Hong
Kong lies a monster: the laws of Hong Kong as written and the laws of
Hong Kong as enforced by Great Britain are not the same. The laws
allow the government a great deal more power than Great Britain has
chosen to assert; the PRC may not exercise such restraint. In reality,
Hong Kong has been treated benevolently by its sovereign ruler and its
people have been left alone to conduct business virtually independently.
Under British rule, the people of Hong Kong have enjoyed civil rights-
particularly freedom of speech and of the press-approximately equal to
those of the people of Great Britain, but much greater than their written
laws would suggest. In handing Hong Kong over to the PRC, the gov-
ernment of Great Britain is giving the PRC government free license to
enforce the letter of the law rather than the spirit.
Defamation, that tenuous crossroads where free speech and social
stability meet, is treated differently under pre-1997 Hong Kong law than
under PRC law. Recent actions of the PRC government suggest that it
* B.A., Yale University, 1987.
1. A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of
Hong Kong, 26 September 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. No
amendments were allowed by the terms of the agreement, therefore this draft version is the
same as the final form.
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intends to enforce the Hong Kong defamation laws as written, with PRC
interpretation of terms. Such an interpretation will differ from the Brit-
ish law and will be a drastic departure from the law enforcement cur-
rently enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong.
This Note examines the defamation law found in the People's Re-
public of China and in the British colony of Hong Kong as currently
enforced and compares them. Then, the potential conflict between the
two is examined in light of the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over
Hong Kong in 1997. In particular, the issues of interpretation and en-
forcement of Hong Kong statutory law as written are addressed. Finally,
a method of resolving disputes between the two systems is proposed.
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF HONG KONG AND THE
PRC
The differences between the legal systems of Hong Kong and the
PRC are the result of different government structures and philosophies.
Hong Kong, as a colony of Great Britain, is influenced by both a demo-
cratic and non-democratic system. The common law which forms the
foundation of Hong Kong law comes from Great Britain, a representa-
tive democracy.2 Although the colony3 itself is subject to British laws
which affect it, the people of Hong Kong do not have direct representa-
tion in Parliament. In addition, Hong Kong has laws of its own, but
these laws are not promulgated by a representative government.' Thus,
there is no direct democracy in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the laws of
Hong Kong are written to allow Great Britain to maintain sovereign con-
trol over the territory.'
Similarly, the PRC government is not a representative democracy;
but the form differs from that of Hong Kong. The PRC features a cen-
trally controlled socialist system with an extensive multi-level bureau-
cracy. After 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative
Region (SAR).6 The PRC government hopes to maintain a policy of
2. PETER WESLEY-SMITH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG LEGAL SYSTEM
17 (1987).
3. Great Britain refers to Hong Kong as a "Territory."
4. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 17.
5. 19th century colonial powers often took a rather paternalistic attitude towards their
colonies. Furthermore, the colonial power and colonies had a symbiotic relationship. The
sovereign created dependence on the part of the colony (through law among other things) and
in turn was dependent on the colony for raw materials. ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND
EMPIRE 15, 19 (1968).
6. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371. The PRC has other areas which are treated
differently under the law. For example, the municipalities of Beijing and Shanghai are treated
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"one country, two systems" with respect to Hong Kong.'
A. The Hong Kong Legal System
Hong Kong has been a colony of Great Britain since 1842 when it
was ceded by China as a result of the Opium War.' Great Britain's tak-
ing of Hong Kong by force has engendered a great deal of resentment
among the Chinese people and is a constant reminder that China was
easily defeated by a foreign power.'
The government of Hong Kong is not democratic. Although some
members of the Legislative Council (Legco) are elected directly, most
government positions are "appointed... by the Queen on the advice of
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom." 10 Additionally, one com-
mentator has noted that the political evolution of Hong Kong has not
followed the same pattern as other British colonies; Hong Kong has not
embarked on a gradual path towards increasingly representative govern-
ment culminating in independence."
separately from the provinces which contain them and have special administrative powers.
The regions of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiarnen are treated as special
economic zones with regard to the trade and production that occurs there. For a PRC per-
spective on the special economic zones (SEZs), see SEZr Keep Impetus, CHINA DAILY (Bus.
Wdy. Supp.), Dec. 11, 1989, at 1.
7. The phrase "one country, two systems" was first introduced in a 1972 speech by Deng
Xiao-ping. It means having two governmental systems coexisting in one country. The fate of
Hong Kong under this system has ramifications for Taiwan because many Chinese people hope
that the PRC, with its socialist government, and Taiwan, with its increasingly representative
government, will be reunited. See generally Raymond Wacks, Introduction, in THE FUTURE
OF THE LAW IN HONG KONG 3 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989).
8. The Opium War arose after a dispute regarding British sale and trade of opium in
China. After conflicts between the British traders and Commissioner Lin, the Chinese govern-
ment official in charge of combatting the serious drug problem in China, the British Govern-
ment stepped in, took control of the opium, and used its gunboats to defend its alleged right to
trade the drug. With the Yangtze River and coastal areas blockaded by the militarily superior
British navy, the Chinese Government had no choice but surrender. The resulting treaty, the
Treaty of Nanjing, included a provision ceding Hong Kong to the British. The emperor of
China was reportedly "enraged" by this resolution and the bitterness of many Chinese over the
cession has continued to the present day. IMMANUEL C.Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN
CHINA 184-93 (1983).
9. The preamble to the Basic Law, Hong Kong's new constitution, reflects this attitude:
"the government of the People's Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997, thus fulfilling the long-cherished common aspiration
of the Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong." BASIC LAW OF THE HONO KoNO
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [Constitution]
pmbl. [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
10. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 26.
11. Norman Miners, The Normal Pattern of Decolonisation of British Dependent Territo-
ries, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 44-45, 50 (Peter Wesley-Smith & A.Y.
Chen eds., 1988).
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Indeed, one commentator has identified three ways that colonial
power is transferred 2 and Hong Kong fits the least successful of these
models. The most successful type of colonial power transfer involves
gradual democratization within a colony. Independence is granted
when a democratic government machine is in place.1
3
A second model involves granting the colonies independence with-
out any preparation. The problem with this approach is that no govern-
ment replaces the departing sovereign.14 Unfortunate results include
being left to the mercy of a military dictatorship or a civil war breaking
out.,-'
Finally, the colony can be handed over as it is to another sovereign
power. This is the method exemplified in the Joint 'Declaration. Profes-
sor Miner of the Political Science Department of the University of Hong
Kong suggests that Hong Kong's decolonization will be akin to the
"transfers of territory without the consent of the inhabitants which took
place between the imperial powers in the nineteenth century."1 6 One
characteristic of this model is that the wishes of the residents of the col-
ony are not consulted, "though in a few cases some safeguards as to their
treatment and the preservation of certain institutions were inserted in the
treaty."' 7 This is exactly what will occur in Hong Kong. The current
popular debate in the Hong Kong press demanding a representative legis-
lature elected directly before 1997 is too late to be effective.' 8 The sover-
eign powers of Great Britain and the PRC have decided Hong Kong's
fate without really consulting the population of Hong Kong. The cur-
rent government structure will be preserved under the Joint Declaration,
and any systemic change at this late date would violate that treaty. 19
As long as Hong Kong remains a British colony it is controlled by
two tiers of law: British statutory and common law, and those statutes
12. Id at 44-45.
13. Id. at 45. This approach was followed successfully in Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land, and South Africa.
14. Id. This approach was followed after World War II in India, Pakistan, Ceylon,
Burma, and Palestine.
15. Palestine's independence is a particularly disheartening example; the power vacuum
left by the British resulted in an ongoing civil war between the Arabs and Jews. See THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM at xii (1989).
16. Miners, supra note 11, at 53. For example, Malacca was exchanged for Benkulen and
Zanzibar was exchanged for Heligoland. Id. at 44.
17. Id. at 44.
18. Chris Yeung, Government Agrees on Direct Elections Acceleration, FOREIGN BROAD-
CAST INFORMATION SERVICE: CHINA [hereinafter FBIS: CHINA], June 8, 1989, at 58,
19. The Joint Declaration states, "The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain
basically unchanged." Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371.
[Vol. 15
Defamation in Hong Kong and the PRC
promulgated by the Hong Kong Governor and legislature and inter-
preted by the Hong Kong courts.2" The British government has final
authority over all that happens in Hong Kong. It has the power to veto
legislation, pass legislation regarding the colony, appoint the Governor,
and generally control the colony as it wishes."' In reality, however, the
British government has meddled very little with the internal affairs of
Hong Kong. Other than the appointment of the Governor, Hong Kong
residents conduct business as they wish, with little direct interference
from the sovereign government.'
There are several sources of law in Hong Kong. Unlike Great Brit-
ain which has no written constitution, Hong Kong has adopted two writ-
ten constitutional devices, the Letters Patent and the Royal
Instructions.' These devices will be replaced by a new constitution-the
Basic Law-after 1997, pursuant to the Joint Declaration. 2'
The Governor of Hong Kong acts as the rule making body, with
advice from the Legislature.2" The rules made by the Governor are
called "Ordinances." The British Crown and British Parliament may
also make laws for Hong Kong; they, in fact, have power superior to
that of Hong Kong and can overrule anything promulgated by the Gov-
ernor.26 This rarely, if ever, happens.2 7
While most case law comes from Great Britain, Hong Kong does
have its own judicial system and may depart from British common law
and decide cases based on the local circumstances and culture of Hong
Kong.28 For example, as a matter of British common law, a wife may
not be compelled to give evidence against her husband in a criminal pro-
ceeding. Hong Kong courts modified the definition of wife to include
concubines.29 Similarly, in the area of defamation, the fact that a judge
could read Chinese was seen as important when determining whether a
printed article was defamatory. 30 Finally, the concept of what the "rea-
sonable person" would view as defamatory would be based on the values
20. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 11.
21. Id at 38.
22. Id
23. rd at 20.
24. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1372.
25. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 11.
26. Id
27. Id at 11.
28. Id at 12.
29. Id at 39.
30. Lok Kwai-fu v. Y.C. Chan, 1978 H.K.L.R. 225, 228. Justice Li notes that he has
"been blessed with the ability to read the original text of the article which is written in Chi-
nese.... I am not trying to boast that I can read Chinese. I make this observation merely to
1992]
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of the reasonable Hong Kong citizen, not the reasonable British citizen.'t
Hong Kong's common law system, with its foundation in Great
Britain, faces potential problems when the colony is transferred over to
the Chinese government. In essence, the foundation of basic legal princi-
ples and definitions will be stripped away, leaving a shaky legal structure.
Currently, when a Hong Kong judge has a question of interpretation, she
or he looks to the Hong Kong constitutional devices and British case
law. Sources for legal analysis in the future are not so clear. The Joint
Agreement is vague as to sources of law. The Basic Law, however, states
that the PRC Constitution controls.32 Regardless of how much British
common law is retained, the PRC will dictate key legal definitions and
policies. Despite the fact that sovereignty is not officially passed until
July 1, 1997, 33 the PRC's willingness to assert its interpretation of Hong
Kong law is already becoming apparent,34 and this trend will accelerate
as 1997 draws closer. "Defamation" and every other legal concept will
be defined as the PRC government chooses to define it.
The Hong Kong statutes will not protect the people of Hong Kong
because Great Britain drafted the statutes broadly enough to allow en-
forcement by Great Britain in whatever way it deemed necessary.3"
While there was never a need for Great Britain to crack down on Hong
Kong to maintain the peace, the laws give the governing sovereign
enough latitude to do so. Recent events suggest that, while Great Britain
rarely meddled with Hong Kong citizen's civil rights, the PRC is likely
to take an active role in regulating the speech and activities of Hong
Kong residents.
B. The PRC Legal System
The government policies of the PRC are determined primarily by
the Central People's Government Council, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).36 These bodies
are not independent branches. The groups are divided by task, and often
illustrate that if the translation into English loses some significance in the original text, then
the original publication should be considered." Id.
31. WESLEY-SMrrH, supra note 2, at 39.
32. BAsic LAW, supra note 9, art. 11.
33. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371.
34. The presence of the National People's Army in Hong Kong, allowed by article 14 of
the Basic Law, will ensure that "national security" issues (including speech and dissent) will be
handled in a way acceptable to Beijing.
35. See supra note 5.
36. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 521 (1990).
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the same people hold important positions in more than one group?7
The legislative power in the People's Republic of China is found in
the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee."
While the NPC has many subcommittees, some of which promulgate
laws or regulations, the Standing Committee is the most influential. In
fact, the Standing Committee is so powerful that the NPC merely acts as
a rubber stamp, approving legislation promulgated by the Standing Com-
mittee. The Standing Committee can be considered a functionally sepa-
rate organ of the government. It has extensive legislative power, may
review legislation, and also has some judicial review power, "which en-
ables it to revoke regulations of the State Council [the executive organ]
and of regional governments that are not in conformity with the Consti-
tution or laws."39 However, the Standing Committee is not responsible
for all laws promulgated by the NPC.
Because the NPC has approximately 3,000 members,/ it delegates
responsibility for actual drafting of legislation to committees, primarily
the Legal Work Committee.4 1 Other committees, including the Standing
Committee, may also introduce draft legislation.42
The State Council is the "executive branch" of the PRC and makes
administrative laws and regulations.43 It may also introduce legislation
in the NPC.'
The laws and regulations are promulgated by an extensive web of
bureaucracy. Regional governments enforce the laws made by the NPC
and may also promulgate their own local legislation.45 While the PRC
Constitution states that no regional laws may contradict the Constitution
or national laws, this aim is not always achieved, perhaps because many
of the laws are unpublished or unavailable." This fluidity suggests toler-
ance of variant government structures by both the Chinese people and
government of the PRC. Indeed, the ability to ignore inconsistencies
may be the best hope for Hong Kong to live peacefully under PRC rule.
37. Id
38. HENRY P. ZHENG, CHINAS CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAw 6 (1988). "[D]elegates
do not serve on a fulil-time basis, and do not necessarily reside in Beijing where the National
People's Congress sits. They participate in the National People's Congress only when it is in
session. The National People's Congress convenes once every year.... ." Id
39. Id at 7 (citing XLANFA [Constitution] art. 67 (1982)).
40. Id at 6.
41. Id
42. Id at 7.
43. Id at 8.
44. Id
45. Id at 11.
46. Id
19921
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Overlaying this entire system is the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). While not a formal part of the government structure, its leaders
usually hold key government positions and Party membership has been
the key to political success in the PRC.47 CCP cadres hold great power
at regional and local levels. Their interpretation of laws and regulations
goes virtually unchallenged.4"
Finally, the PRC has a court system. However, cultural biases
against litigation reduce its importance. Most problems are addressed
though extensive informal problem solving (e.g., among families, village
groups, and workplace groups)49 and formal mediation50 occurs before
lawsuits are filed. Formal court decisions have no precedential value and
are largely unpublished,51 significantly reducing the usefulness of litiga-
tion. Because of the unpredictability of results, litigation is often used
only as a last-ditch solution to an individual problem.
III. HONG KONG DEFAMATION LAW
Hong Kong's statutory defamation law is found in the Defamation
Ordinance.52 Defamation is the "publication of a [false] statement which
exposes a [person] to hatred, ridicule or contempt or causes him [or her]
to be shunned or avoided by right-thinking members of society gener-
ally."'53 The statute, as one commentator has pointed out, "goes into
detail, cites chapter and verse, but somehow it fails to explain. It is too
vague, too remote to mean anything to anybody turning to it for gui-
dance."'54 Indeed, the statute does not give an explicit definition of what
a defamatory publication would contain. Hong Kong's definition of def-
amation can be inferred from a combination of the statute itself and the
47. SPENCE, supra note 36, at 438, 514-17.
48. Id. at 591-92.
49. John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr., Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolu-
tion Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, 35 AM. J. COMP.
L. 761, 762-63 (1987).
50. Id.
51. William C. Jones, Collection of Civil Law Cases from the People's Republic of China,
10 REv. Soc. L. 169 (1984).
52. LAWS OF HONG KONG, Defamation Ordinance, ch. 21 (1986) (originally enacted as
Defamation Ordinance 5 of 1887) [hereinafter Defamation Ordinance].
53. VALERIE A. PENLINGTON, LAW IN HONG KONG: AN INTRODUCTION 178 (1986),
This definition is from the British case Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 A.E.R. 1237. See infra note 80
and accompanying text. "Publication" is a term of art. If a statement is spoken to another, it
is considered published.
54. JAMES C.Y. SHEN, THE LAW AND MASS MEDIA IN HONG KONG 28 (1972), Prof.
Shen concludes: "It [the Defamation Ordinance] demands revision." Id. The Defamation
Ordinance was revised in 1982, but the problems Prof. Shen pointed out remain.
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common law. The statute alone provides only examples, exceptions, and
a few clues.
Without defining any of the key terms, the Defamation Ordinance
states: "Any person who maliciously publishes any defamatory libel,
knowing the same to be false, shall be liable to imprisonment [sic] for 2
years, and, in addition, to pay such fine as the court may award. '"55 The
unknowing publication of a libelous statement can result in imprison-
ment for one year and a fine.
5 6
Criminal and civil defamation are not distinguished in the statute.
While there is no explicit civil definition, the statute implies several re-
quirements for civil defamation actions. In order to be considered de-
famatory, a publication must be false and published with malice.57 The
first requirement is that the material published be untrue.5" If in addition
the publisher had knowledge of the falsity there is a greater penalty. 59
Knowledge is not required; the malicious publication of libel without
explicit knowledge of its falsity can also result in conviction.' It is not
explained, however, how one can publish maliciously without knowledge
of falsity. Nonetheless, if it cannot be shown that malice was present, the
defendant will be found not guilty.
61
The Defamation Ordinance also provides criminal penalties for
some defamation actions. Section 5 states that a person may be impris-
oned for two years and fined for "maliciously publish[ing] any defama-
tory libel, knowing the same to be false."'6 Section 6 finds that person
who maliciously publishes libel without knowledge can be imprisoned for
one year.63 Despite the availability of these criminal sanctions, however,
the criminal defamation statute is rarely, if ever, invoked.
6
In order to bring a criminal defamation action, there must be a pre-
liminary finding by a judge that the action can be brought.65 In Chiu
Chut-fong v. Law Chup,66 the only case on criminal defamation recorded
55. Defamation Ordinance, supra note 52, § 5.
56. Id. § 6.
57. Id § 4.
58. Id §§ 5-6.
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id § 12.
62. Id § 5.
63. Id, §6.
64. Malcom Merry, Freedom of Expression: Defamation and Contempt, in CIVIL LInER-
TIES IN HONG KONG 186, 187 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988).
65. Defamation Ordinance, supra note 52, § 18.
66. 1973 H.K.L.R. 36.
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in the digests,6 7 the court discussed the appropriateness of the criminal
libel action. The court noted that, "There appears to be no local prece-
dent for such an application."68 The court discouraged defamation ac-
tions, stating:
It is true that a criminal prosecution for libel ought not to be instituted
and, if instituted, will probably be regarded with disfavor by judge and
jury, when the libel complained of is of so trivial a character as to be
unlikely either to disturb the peace of the community or seriously af-
fect the reputation of the person defamed.69
The desire to prevent disturbances of the peace and presumably prevent
citizens from taking justice into their own hands is the impetus for al-
lowing criminal penalties for libel. Thus, the paucity of criminal libel
cases is not surprising in light of the basic principles underlying a crimi-
nal libel claim.
With this in mind, the court allowed plaintiff in Chiu Chut-fong to
proceed with her libel action. A newspaper had reported that her hus-
band, who had been killed in a tragic accident, was a drug dealer. The
court found this to be "an affront so grave as to affect the behaviour of
living persons."' 70 Thus, plaintiff could pursue a criminal action.
Although the statutory language of the Defamation Ordinance pro-
vides little guidance, the case law provides a framework for analysis. The
analysis of common law defamation, both civil and criminal, consists of a
two part test. First, the court must determine if "all or any of the publi-
cations.., can in any way be referable to [the plaintiff]." 71 Second, if the
publication refers to plaintiff, the court must determine whether "taken
individually or as a whole" the publication is libelous.
72
The first step of the analysis is not usually difficult to prove. For
example, in Lok Kwai-fu v. Y. C. Chan, an actor and actress sued a movie
magazine for suggesting that they were having an extramarital affair.
Accompanying the article, there was a photo of the actor and actress.
The caption neglected to give the actor's name, but described him by his
nickname, "big stomach king."' 73 The article also identified the woman
in Chinese characters. These characters suggested her identity by the use
67. Hong Kong has privately published digests which work similarly to our own. One
looks up cases by subject, in this case "Torts" and "Defamation." See, e.g., A DIGEST Ov
HONG KONG CIVIL CASE LAW 1954-1968 (Frank Addison ed., 1970).
68. Chiu Chut-fong, 1973 H.K.L.R. at 38.
69. Id. at 42 (citing Rex v. Henry William Wicks, [1936] 1 All E.R. 384, 386).
70. Id. at 36.
71. Lok Kwai-fu v. Y.C. Chan, 1978 H.K.L.R. 225, 228.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 229.
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of homonyms.74 The Lok Kwai-fu court found that these descriptions
and names were sufficient to identify plaintiffs."1 Lok Kwai-fu appears to
be a fairly simple case.
Identification is not always straightforward, however. Sim Hok-
gwan v. Tin Tin Yat Po Ltd.7 6 involved an obstetrician allegedly so negli-
gent that he caused two babies to die and injured other babies and
mothers. Reports of the incidents appeared in two newspapers. In order
to determine if the first prong of the defamation test was met, the Hong
Kong court adopted the test created in the British case of Morgan v.
Odom's Press.' The Morgan court explained, "The plaintiff must prove
that the words of the article would convey a defamatory meaning con-
cerning himself to a reasonable person possessed of knowledge of the ex-
trinsic facts."'78 Using this test, the court found that one of the
publications clearly identified plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court refused to
accept the first publication as proof that a second publication also identi-
fied plaintiff. The court noted, "A plaintiff cannot rely on the publication
by X of matter which clearly identifies him, to support his claim that a
publication by Y does So." '7 9 Therefore, the identification of plaintiff
must be objectively clear wholly within the offending publication.
The second step, determining whether the publication is libelous, is
more subjective. The "classic" test for whether articles, taken as a whole,
are defamatory is found in Sim v. Stretch."" There, Lord Atkin framed
the question as "whether the words tended to lower the plaintiff in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally."81 Using this
test, the Sim Hok-gwan court found that the use of the word "bungled"
in the headline and phrases like "dereliction of duty" within the text
describing the incidents with the doctor would lead the reasonable reader
to believe that plaintiff had acted with less than professional care.81
A. Governmental Immunity
While the press is usually the defendant in Hong Kong defamation
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 1981 H.K.L.R. 227.
77. [1971] 2 A.E.R. 1156.
78. Sim Hok-gwan, 1981 H.K.L.R. 232 (quoting Morgan v. Odom's Press, [1971] 2
A.E.R. 1156).
79. Id.
80. [1936] 2 A.E.R. 1237, cited in Sim Hok.gwan, 1981 H.U.L.R. at 229.
81. Id,
82. Sim Hok-gwan, 1981 H.K.L.R. at 230.
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actions,83 individuals, including government officials, may be liable for
slanderous or libelous statements made about others. Some members of
the government are completely immune from defamation actions pro-
vided the speech took place while performing their governmental func-
tions.8 4 For example, members of the Legislative Council "enjoy
absolute privilege in the law of defamation [with respect to] statements
they make in the course of its proceedings."' " Similarly, members of the
Executive Council are absolutely immune from defamation actions aris-
ing from statements made within the scope of their governmental du-
ties;86 members of the main council, the Urban Council, enjoy the same
privilege. 87 The rationale for such immunity is not surprising: lawmak-
ing requires vigorous debate and discussion and the threat of defamation
suits would stifle such discussion. A British court agreed: "The public
good requires no restraint beyond the rules of the House itself ....
[Lawmakers] cannot satisfactorily discharge [their] duties if they are lia-
ble to defamation actions at every turn."88
Other members of government, however, have only limited immu-
nity, or none at all.8 9 For example, members of government advisory
committees have a duty to keep matters discussed confidential and may
only reveal them publicly for significant, necessary reasons.90 If they do
not keep a matter confidential, they can be sued for harming the reputa-
tions of those they spoke about.
B. Citizens' Duty and Criminal Liability
Citizens have a duty to report misconduct or neglect of government
officials or employees, but the privilege to do so is qualified and their
immunity from suit limited because the complaint must be made to an
appropriate person (i.e., one who has the power to do something about
83. See, eg., Bridge v. Wai, 1984 H.K.L.R. 225 (attorney won damages against a newspa-
per which reported falsely that he was being sued by his former law firm for taking away
clients in violation of their agreement); Sim v. Tin Tin Yat Po, 1981 H.K.L.R. 227 (obstetri-
cian was falsely accused in newspaper of having killed two babies and harmed two other babies
and their mothers); Lok v. Y.C.Chan, 1978 H.K.L.R. 225 (weekly gossip magazine published
false article about infidelity of actor and actress).
84. Andrew Li, Government and the Law of Defamation, 3 HONG KONG L.J. 268, 270
(1973) [hereinafter Li, Government and Defamation].
85. Id. No distinction is made between the elected and appointed members of the
Council.
86. Id. at 277. Again, elected and appointed members have the same privilege.
87. Id. at 280.
88. Id. at 270 (citing Gipps v. McElhone 1881 N.S.W.L.R. 18, 22 (Austl.)).
89. Id. at 282, 286.
90. Id. at 283-84.
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it)." The vagueness of this combined duty and liability on the part of
citizens may stifle political speech which takes the form of criticism of
government officials or public figures. If a citizen disagrees with the con-
duct of a particular government official, the conduct may be reported to a
higher authority. If, however, the conduct turns out to be legal, the citi-
zen may be liable for reporting falsely. The difference between political
speech criticizing government action and falsely accusing an official of
wrongdoing is far from clear.
Suits for defamation resulting from citizen complaints about officials
have been brought. In the British case of Harrison v. Bush,' a citizen
complained to the Home Secretary regarding the conduct of a magis-
trate. The complaint should have been made to the Lord Chancellor,
who has the power of removing the magistrate. The court found, how-
ever, that the complaint was really made to the Crown and thus the
Home Secretary could handle it. Therefore, the citizen was not liable for
defamation. Similarly, in Beach v. Freeson93 a complaint regarding a so-
licitor made to the Lord Chancellor instead of the Law Society was
found to be acceptable because it would be contrary to public policy to
punish a citizen for a mistaken belief as to whom to report.94 Professor
Li points out that it is not clear how high one must go to report various
offenses or complaints in Hong Kong;9" the issue has not been litigated
heavily.
The fact that a citizen has only limited immunity from a defamation
suit when criticizing government officials for their conduct in carrying
out their official duties suggests that such speech may not be character-
ized as political commentary (and thus protected) as it is in the United
States.9 6 There have been no recently reported cases which address this
issue. Commentators seem to indicate without much discussion that this
type of speech falls under the defense of "fair comment."' 7 In order for
speech to be characterized as fair comment, it must be regarding a matter
of public interest and may not be made with malice or comment on the
91. Id at 286-87.
92. [1855] 5 E. & B. 344.
93. [1972] 1 Q.B. 14.
94. Li, Government and Defamation, supra note 84, at 287.
95. Id
96. See, eg., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). In New York Times v.
Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court found that public officials could not sue for libel
because speech criticizing them in their official duties was political speech and therefore pro-
tected under the First Amendment of the Constitution. Recovery is allowed only if malice is
involved.
97. PENLINGTON, supra note 53, at 182.
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person's character. 98
In sum, defamation in Hong Kong seems to be a private, civil mat-
ter. The laws as written, however, provide no special protection for
Hong Kong citizens who criticize the government, other than the com-
mon law defense of "fair comment." Nonetheless, if the criticism is vitri-
olic enough, it could easily be characterized as defamation, perhaps even
criminal defamation, under both Hong Kong and PPRC law.
IV. DEFAMATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
The right to reputation is guaranteed by the Constitution of the
PRC.9 9 Specifically, the Constitution states that "the personal dignity of
citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false
charge or frame-up directed against citizens by any means is prohib-
ited.' '"" ° The Constitution sets forth further prohibitions against defam-
ing the government. It states that PRC citizens "have the right to
criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary" but
that "fabrication or distortion of facts for the purpo;e of libel or frame-
up is prohibited."101
The right to reputation is even more explicit in the General Princi-
ples of Civil Law, the PRC's recent attempt at codifying its tort and
economic law.102 Article 101 states that citizens have a right to their
reputations and dignity and that "it is forbidden for anyone to damage
the reputation of a citizen or a legal person by the use of slander, libel, or
similar means."
10 3
Unlike Hong Kong, where the application of rules to specific fact
situations is available in published case law, the application of law to
particular cases is generally unavailable in the PRC. Reports of recent
decisions, while sometimes printed, are not widely distributed." Profes-
sor William C. Jones of the Washington University School of Law in St.
Louis notes that, "There is no system for general publication of the deci-
sions of courts though it is clear that opinions are written and records are
98. Id.
99. XIANFA [Constitution] art. 38 (1982) (P.R.C.).
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 41.
102. General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, reprinted in 52
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 47, 48 (1989).
103. Id.
104. Jones, supra note 51, at 169.
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kept, and these are available to some persons in the legal profession." 10 5
Furthermore, case law does not serve as binding authority for judges, but
is merely a sample or suggestion.'1 6 The main source of information re-
garding litigation is the press, in the form of newspapers, magazines, ra-
dio, and television.
A recent, celebrated case of defamation reported in the press in-
volved PRC movie star Lu Xiao Qing. Through some confusion with the
tax bureau, Ms. Lu failed to receive notice of taxes which were allegedly
past due. The local Shanghai press published a report of her alleged tax
evasion. The amount of the alleged evasion was significantly overstated
in the newspaper and, in fact, Ms. Lu did not owe any additional taxes.
She sued the reporter for damage to her reputation. Like most disputes
in the PRC, the case never made it to trial and was instead was subject
to court mandated mediation."0 7 The parties reached a settlement
through the mediation.108 This settlement was accepted by the court and
thus had the same legal effect as a judgment."°9 The terms of the settle-
ment were: 1) Defendant admitted that the article contained statements
which were untrue and some comments which were "improper" and that
the article affected plaintiff negatively, 2) Defendant agreed to publish an
apology, 3) Plaintiff acknowledged that Defendant's motive was inno-
cent and that the article was published in good faith, 4) Plaintiff with-
drew request for monetary damages because of Defendant's good faith,
and 5) Defendant paid court costs (twenty yuan).110
One case that was litigated concerned a novelist whose story ques-
tioned a clerk's ability as a statistician. The author published the story in
a literary magazine. The court decided that the article used "insulting
language" and ordered an apology and 3,300 yuan payment.11 '
105. 1,d
106. Id at 170. In the Explanation [an Introduction] to the Collection of Civil Law Cases,
the Civil Division of the Sichuan Province Supreme People's Court states that while the Peo-
ple's Courts have "conscientiously carried out the line decreed at the eleventh session of the
Third Plenum, the general and specific policies and the country's laws" and have been doing
good work, that the Court has "selected and published fourteen [cases] which we offer to the
cadres involved in adjudication to study and refer to." Id.
107. 9 SHANGHAI FAYuAN 34 (1990). For the viewpoint of the defense counsel, see Lu
Xiao Qing's Defamation Action Was Successfully Conciliated, 5 LAWYER AND LAW 16 (1990).
See also Film star files libel suit against Xinhua reporter, CHINA DAILY, July 25, 1989, at 3;
and Film star pays her income tax, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 17, 1989, at 3.
108. 9 SHANGHAI FAYUAN 46 (1990).
109. Id
110. Id
111. Libeled clerk wins apologies and cash, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 13, 1989, at 3. 3,300 yuan
equals approximately $598. Currency Trading, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1992, at C15. The aver-
age factory worker in China makes approximately 1600 yuan per year.
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As in Hong Kong, defamation is a crime as well as a tort in the
PRC.112 Unlike Hong Kong, however, criminal defaation cases in the
PRC are common and the punishment severe. Article 145 of the Crimi-
nal Law states that defamation, "when the circumstances are serious,"
can result in "not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment,
criminal detention or deprivation of political rights."' 1 3 Some cases of
defamation that would probably be treated as civil defamation cases else-
where are considered to be "serious" by PRC standards and thus fall
under the criminal defamation law. A writer was sentenced recently to
one year in prison and fined 2,000 yuan for publishing a novel in a liter-
ary magazine which allegedly contained names and unflattering descrip-
tions of real people in a village. Villagers filed the lawsuit because "their
personal dignity and reputation were seriously harmed and that great
mental pain and economic losses were caused to them."' 14 The court
found that "[i]n this case, the accused adopted mean tricks and the case
was serious, so she was found guilty of libel."'1 15 The decision to hold the
writer guilty of libel is not shocking; however, the prison term and huge
fine are significantly harsher punishments than would be meted out by a
Hong Kong court.'
16
An even harsher punishment of twenty years in prison was given to
a factory technician who allegedly falsely accused the factory director of
crimes. The court concluded that, "The reputation of the director and
the credibility of the factory were badly damaged by the false
accusations."
1 17
The Criminal Law additionally states, "Using any method or means
falsely to accuse and frame cadres or the masses is strictly prohibited.""1 8
This clause presents some additional complications because it allows the
government to restrict easily citizens' speech. Undoubtedly, a citizen
can be prosecuted criminally for "defaming" the government. In an arti-
cle entitled "On Whether Speeches Can Constitute Crimes," a govern-
ment representative named Zhu Shang said that while "[fUreedom of
speech is one of the basic democratic rights of the citizens of [the PRC]
112. THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CHINA art. 145 (1984).
113. Id.
114. Xiamen Writer Sentenced to 1 Year for Libel, FBIS: CHINA, Jan. 22, 1990, at 26-27.
115. Id. at 27.
116. For a summary of various tort damages awarded in defamation cases, see Peter F.
Rhodes, Damages for Defamation in Hong Kong, 11 H.K.L.R. 167 (1981) and Peter F.
Rhodes, Damages for Defamation in Hong Kong-An Update, 18 H.K.L.R. 49 (1988). Prof.
Rhodes indicates that these awards generally range from $1,000 to $125,000.
117. Slanderer Jailed for 20 Years, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 19, 1989, at 3.
118. THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CHINA art. 138.
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... [t]here is no absolute freedom in the world.""1 9 He emphasized that
freedom of speech brings both a right and duty to PRC citizens:
Freedom of speech must be based on the adherence to the four basic
principles' 2 and observance of the state law. If it is not so based, it
will be misunderstood and regarded as freedom from the restrictions of
the law, freedom to insult and malign other people at will and freedom
to speak at will against the Party and socialism.1 '7
Zhu then suggested that in criticizing the State (another supposed right
of the people found in section 26 of the Criminal Law), a "strict distinc-
tion" should be made between "normal criticism and insults and defama-
tion."' He also notes that "offences of insult and defamation that
seriously harm the social order and the interests of the state ... as well as
defamation of Party and state leaders that brings serious harm can and
should be punished by the judicial departments in accordance with the
law. ' 123
Criticism of the government is perceived by the PRC government as
dangerous and punishable. At various times severe restrictions on citi-
zens' civil rights have focused on the content of citizens' speech. For
example, in 1979 there was a highly publicized trial of a dissident au-
thor/editor, Wei Jing-sheng. 24 During the same period of governmental
restriction of civil rights, the Four Freedoms,125 including traditional
criticism of government found on big character posters, 26 were
outlawed.
27
119. Zhu Shang, Can Speeches Constitute Crimes, PEoPLE's DAILY, July 16, 1982, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
120. The four basic principles of the Chinese Communist Party are the dictatorship of the
proletariat, party leadership, the socialist line, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought. Hsu, supra note 8, at 799 (footnote added).
121. PEoPLE's DAILY, supra note 119, at FE/7086/BI/6.
122. Id. "Insult and defamation is an offence, and no citizen is allowed to utter insults or
defamations." Id.
123. Id
124. SPENCE, supra note 36, at 665. See also Ellen R. Eliasoph, Note, Free Speech in
China, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 287 (1981).
125. The Four Freedoms are defined by Hsu as "to speak out freely, to air one's %iews
fully, to engage in great debates, and to write big-character posters." Hsu, supra note 8, at
799. These rights were deleted from the PRC party constitution at the Fifth Plenum of the
Eleventh Central Committee, which met on February 23-29, 1980. Id
126. "Big-character posters" are a form of political expression in the PRC. They are usu-
ally large posters hung in public places with terse criticisms of public officials, often through
allusions to historical or literary figures. See also LiANG HENO & JUDITH SHAPIRO, SON OF
THE REVOLUTION 52-54 (1983) (interesting examples of big-character posters which were
posted criticizing Liang's father shortly before the Cultural Revolution).
127. THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CHINA art. 145. See also Eliasoph, supra note 124, at 287.
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A more recent example is that of Shanghai CCP cadres who are
suing a Shanghai newspaper for defamation relating to events occurring
during the Tienanmen Square Massacre. The cadres allege that the arti-
cle contained minor inaccuracies. A political speech defense was re-
jected. Already, with 1997 only a few years away, the PRC government
demonstrates its intolerance of dissident speech and criticism.
V. COMPARISON OF PRC AND HONG KONG
DEFAMATION LAW IN LIGHT OF 1997
REUNIFICATION
In 1997 sovereignty over Hong Kong will be returned to the
PRC.'2 A joint committee comprised of members from both the PRC
and Hong Kong has drafted a new basic law for Hong Kong. 129 The
Basic Law will replace the current Hong Kong constitutional devices of
the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions. 30
The administration of Hong Kong is to be conducted independently
of the PRC.'3 ' For example, the PRC government may not levy taxes on
Hong Kong.'32 In financial matters, such as budgeting and spending, the
Hong Kong government is to act on its own, but is to report to the Cen-
tral People's Government "for the record."' 1
33
The Joint Declaration is premised on the condition that Hong Kong
will maintain a "high degree of autonomy" and "preserve the way of life
in Hong Kong."' 34 Neither of these phrases is defined explicitly within
the document.
The Joint Declaration does specify, however, that the current laws
of Hong Kong are to "remain basically unchanged." 135 Specifically,
"[the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with ex-
ecutive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication." '36 This broad statement of autonomy is tempered by the
fact that foreign affairs and national defense are the responsibilities of the
PRC government.' 37 While the governmental structure of Hong Kong is
128. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1370.
129. Emily Lau, The Early History of the Drafting Process, in TiE BASIc LAW AND HONG
KONG's FUTURE, supra note 11, at 90-98.
130. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 20.
131. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1374.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1368.
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to remain the same, the chief executive "will be appointed by the Central
People's Government." '38 Because the current Hong Kong chief execu-
tive, the Governor, has such broad legislative and executive powers, this
appointment power will constitute a great amount of control for the PRC
government. There is no guarantee that Hong Kong will be allowed to
act virtually independently, as Great Britain has allowed.
One feature of the agreement that points to retention of the current
style of government involvement is that Hong Kong is to remain an "in-
ternational financial centre."' 39 As part of this goal, traditional capitalist
institutions such as foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures markets
will be allowed to continue. "There will be free flow of capital," and the
Hong Kong dollar will remain convertible.14°
Despite these assurances from Beijing, the future of Hong Kong as a
financial center is in great doubt. The rate of capital flight from Hong
Kong is increasing. Since 1985, "more than 70 companies have [either]
moved their headquarters out of Hong Kong" or are planning to do
so. 1 41 Furthermore, Hong Kong residents themselves are far from confi-
dent that "It]he current social and economic systems [and lifestyle] in
Hong Kong will remain unchanged." '42 Recent polls show that Hong
Kong residents are anxious about their future. A survey taken in Hong
Kong shortly after the imposition of martial law in the PRC and before
the Tiananmen Square Massacre 43 "showed a dramatic decline in confi-
dence to levels not seen since the signing of the Sino-British Joint Decla-
ration in 1984. ' ' 14 A second poll, taken about the same time "confirm[s]
that confidence in either government's ability to maintain 'stability and
prosperity' in Hong Kong has been badly eroded."14 A South China
Morning Post editorial declares these polls to be a "clear signal to China
that faith in the future was already ebbing fast, even before the
Tienanmen Square massacre."" 4  More recent surveys show "record
low[s] in confidence" among Hong Kong's businesspeople. 147 Most omi-
138. Id at 1372.
139. Id
140. Id
141. Bill Powell & Peter McKillop, To Leave or Not to Leave, NEwsWEEK, Sept. 24, 1990,
at 62; Letters to the Editor, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1990, at 19.
142. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1372.
143. Troops Attack and Crush Beiying Protest; Thousands Fight Back, Scores Are Killed,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1989, at 1.
144. Editorial Says Polls Reveal Depth of Anxiety, FBIS: CHINA, June 21, 1989, at 85.
145. Ad
146. Id
147. Chan Chi-Keung & Nick Thompson, Business Survey Shows Record Low in Confi-
dence, FBIS: CHINA, Mar. 20, 1990, at 57.
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
nously, "[f]ewer than 25 percent believe the recently published Basic
Law would enhance Hong Kong's attraction as a business centre."
148
Those involved in business are not the only Hong Kong residents
concerned about the future. Citizens in general do not seem confident
that the life-style of Hong Kong will be preserved by the PRC govern-
ment. One survey shows that one in six Hong Kong residents plan to
leave before 1997.149 "A majority of the people in Hong Kong expect by
1997 to be in possession of a passport which will give them an escape
route from Hong Kong .... 10
On its face, the Basic Law guarantees Hong Kong residents the free-
doms of speech, of the press, and of publication. 1" Furthermore, the
current judicial system is to remain in effect, including the presumption
of innocence in criminal trials.1 5 2 It remains to be seen whether these
broad guarantees will stand up to the legislative review power over Hong
Kong granted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress.15 3 Many Hong Kong citizens and other observers do not believe
that the PRC government will guarantee civil rights of the Hong Kong
citizens. 154
Using defamation law as an example, it is clear that the anxiety of
current Hong Kong resident is not without basis. It is likely that civil
defamation cases, presently the majority of defamation cases, will pro-
ceed as before. Both PRC and Hong Kong law require that the allegedly
defamatory material refer to the plaintiff,155 be untrue, 156 and injure the
reputation of the plaintiff." 7
In the area of criminal defamation, however, Hong Kong faces a
crisis of legal interpretation. Currently, it is rare in Hong Kong to have
criminal defamation actions, and when they do occur, they must get past
the administrative safeguard of a preliminary hearing.15 8 No such proce-
dural device exists in the PRC. Will one Hong Kong judge be able to
148. l
149. Bernard Fong, Survey Finds I in 6 Plan to Leave Before 1997, FBIS: CHINA, June 22,
1989, at 70.
150. Id
151. BAsic LAW, supra note 9, ch. III, art. 27.
152. Id ch. IV, art. 87.
153. Michael C. Davis, A Common Law Court in a Marxist Country: The Case for Judicial
Review in the Hong Kong SAR, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1987). The Standing
Committee of the NPC is generally seen as the true political power source in the PRC.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
155. Lok Kwai-fu v. Y.C. Chan, 1978 H.K.L.R. 225.
156. Defamation Ordinance, supra note 52, § 5.
157. PENLINGTON, supra note 53, at 178.
158. Defamation Ordinance, supra note 52, § 18.
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stand up the NPC Standing Committee and refuse to allow a defamation
action to continue? Furthermore, the imposition of jail sentences for
those convicted of defamation seems to be much more common in the
PRC than in Hong Kong.
Most frightening of all, from Hong Kong citizens' standpoint, it is
the availability of criminal libel sanctions for criticizing the government.
In Hong Kong, public officials may speak freely while carrying out their
public duties,' 59 and citizens are encouraged to voice their opinions re-
garding the government." In the PRC, criticism of government officials
or the PRC government itself is often characterized as "speak[ing] at will
against the Party and socialism," and is a crime.1 6 Such "insult and
defamation" of the socialist government are criminal because they are
seen as potentially harmful to the state itself.162 The resulting climate
discourages any free speech by public officials or citizens.
The PRC reaction to potential threats to the state was illustrated
violently during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. While most of
those jailed or executed were found guilty of various "counter-revolu-
tionary" crimes, especially under Article 102 of the Criminal Law, at
least one student was executed for "spreading rumours,"1 63 a crime
which sounds nearly identical to "trunp[ing] up facts to defame an-
other,"'16 found in the criminal defamation statute. The question in
many Hong Kong citizens' minds is: will 200,000 people thronging the
streets of Hong Kong carrying posters criticizing PRC government ac-
tion' 65 or 10,000 people marching and shouting slogans such as "Down
with Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun" 1 66 be considered a
"peaceful procession"' 16 or "serious harm to the social order" 68 requir-
ing criminal punishment for defamation after 1997? Since the NPC
Standing Committee will be given the power of interpretation, it would
seem that the Hong Kong courts do not stand a chance of preserving the
freedom of speech as residents of Hong Kong currently know it.
159. Li, Government and Defamation, supra note 84, at 270.
160. The existence of the many advisory committees shows the high level of tolerance of
the Hong Kong government for citizen input and dissent.
161. See supra note 120-27 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. AiMNEs INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1990, at 67
(1990).
164. THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CHINA art. 145.
165. 200,000 Demonstrate Against Mainland Bloodshed, FBIS: CHINA, June 5, 1989, at
127.
166. 10,000 Demonstrate Against Beljing Leaders, FBIS: CHINA, Apr. 6, 1990, at 60.
167. Idl
168. CRiMINAL LAW OF CHINA arL 145.
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VI. PROPOSAL
The Hong Kong Basic Law generally and the law of defamation
specifically appear on their face to differ little from the PRC law. Yet
underneath, while the right of final adjudication should provide some
safeguards to Hong Kong's autonomy, 169 the right seems empty since the
PRC government is able to overturn any decision it decides is in violation
of the PRC Constitution. 170 Hong Kong residents have long lived with-
out a definitive interpretation to their statutes. However, the court sys-
tem and government structure currently in place have proven to be stable
and predictable. The sovereignty of the PRC in 1997 will destroy this
predictable structure. The lack of a sure method of interpretation and
the typical means of PRC enforcement will be unacceptable to the resi-
dents of Hong Kong and will result in continued capital flight and emi-
gration. This uncertainity will ultimately undermine one major goal of
the Joint Declaration: the maintenance of Hong Kong as a international
financial center.
Freedom of speech and of the press is an essential component of a
modern industrial and financial center. 7 1 Singapore exemplifies a situta-
tion where lack of free speech and press is detrimental to business inter-
ests. Many businesses which would otherwise have moved from Hong
Kong to Singapore are hesitant to do so because Singapore's restriction
of the Asian Wall Street Journal is considered to be a "competitive disad-
vantage" in a business era which demands the free flow of information.172
How, then, to reconcile the enormous differences in Hong Kong and
PRC's interpretation as to what one can and cannot say? A proposal:
resolve these differences in the same way that the seemingly impossible
idea of reuniting Hong Kong and PRC was resolved.17 3 Hong Kong res-
idents should be given the opportunity to appeal cases, especially crimi-
nal cases, to a joint committee comprised of Hong Kong and PRC
residents. This delegation of review power would not be unique to either
the PRC or Hong Kong governments and would not disrupt the system.
The availability of review would ease the minds and nerves of Hong
Kong residents who fear summary executions and imprisonment for ac-
tions which were previously acceptable. It would also allow the PRC
government some say in how its Special Administrative Region is run.
169. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371.
170. Che-ning Liu, The Power of Interpretation of Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion Basic Law-Where Do We Go From Here?, 5 CHINA L. REP. 185, 186 (1989).
171. Powell & McKillop, supra note 141, at 62.
172. Id.
173. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1370.
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To make the proposal work, it would be important to have more
than token representation of Hong Kong on the committee. The commit-
tee should not become a mere mouthpiece of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee. Indeed, Hong Kong should have significant power over the
committee if the Basic Law's promise of autonomy is to occur.
It may be argued that the Joint Declaration resulted from the PRC
holding the 1997 expiration of the New Territories leases like a gun to
the heads of the British government. The Introduction to the Joint Dec-
laration notes that "there is no possibility of an amended agreement." 174
The British alternative to accepting the present agreement was to have no
agreement. The PRC made it plain that negotiations could not be re-
opened and that it would publish its own plan for Hong Kong if Great
Britain did not agree. Likewise, the proposal for a review committee
cannot be negotiated. However, by analogy, it would seem that the alter-
native to having a joint agreement on how speech criticizing or defaming
others will be handled is to have the PRC government decide the issue
unilaterally through its Standing Committee review power.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some Hong Kong residents await the arrival of 1997 with trepida-
tion and are planning their departures from Hong Kong. Others wel-
come a reunited China. The only sure thing is that no one really knows
what is going to happen.
It is clear that the written laws that currently exist in both Hong
Kong and the PRC are not going to resolve the issues of legal interpreta-
tion and political differences which will result. Because Hong Kong's
laws are purposely vague, a criticism of a public official can be inter-
preted as either fair comment or defamation. Only time will tell if the
people of Hong Kong will find a way to live peacefully under the sover-
eignty of their socialist neighbor.
174. Id.
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